This article presents evidence supporting the claim that ethical reasoning is a skill that can be taught and assessed. We propose a working definition of ethical reasoning as 1) the ability to identify, analyze, and weigh moral aspects of a particular situation, and 2) to make decisions that are informed and warranted by the moral investigation. The evidence consists of a description of an ethical reasoning education program—Ethical Reasoning in Action —designed to increase ethical reasoning skills in a variety of (...) situations and areas of life. ERiA is housed at a public, major comprehensive U.S. university—James Madison University—and assessment of the program focuses on interventions delivered prior to and during orientation for incoming first-year students. Findings indicate that the interventions measurably enhance the ability of undergraduate students to reason ethically. ERiA’s competency-targeted program and positive student learning outcomes offers a promising model for higher education ethics programs seeking to connect classroom learning in ethics to decision-making in everyday life. (shrink)

Incidental fndings of potential medical signifcance are seen in approximately 5-8 percent of asymptomatic subjects and 16 percent of symptomatic subjects participating in large computed tomography colonography studies, with the incidence varying further by CT acquisition technique. While most CTC research programs have a well-defned plan to detect and disclose IFs, such plans are largely communicated only verbally. Written consent documents should also inform subjects of how IFs of potential medical signifcance will be detected and reported in CTC research studies.

BackgroundAn increasing number of studies utilize intracranial electrophysiology in human subjects to advance basic neuroscience knowledge. However, the use of neurosurgical patients as human research subjects raises important ethical considerations, particularly regarding informed consent and undue influence, as well as subjects’ motivations for participation. Yet a thorough empirical examination of these issues in a participant population has been lacking. The present study therefore aimed to empirically investigate ethical concerns regarding informed consent and voluntariness in Parkinson’s disease patients undergoing deep brain (...) stimulator (DBS) placement who participated in an intraoperative neuroscience study.MethodsTwo semi-structured 30-minute interviews were conducted preoperatively and postoperatively via telephone. Interviews assessed participants’ motivations for participation in the parent intraoperative study, recall of information presented during the informed consent process, and participants’ postoperative reflections on the research study.ResultsTwenty-two participants (mean age = 60.9) completed preoperative interviews at a mean of 7.8 days following informed consent and a mean of 5.2 days prior to DBS surgery. Twenty participants completed postoperative interviews at a mean of 5 weeks following surgery. All participants cited altruism or advancing medical science as “very important” or “important” in their decision to participate in the study. Only 22.7% (n = 5) correctly recalled one of the two risks of the study. Correct recall of other aspects of the informed consent was poor (36.4% for study purpose; 50.0% for study protocol; 36.4% for study benefits). All correctly understood that the study would not confer a direct therapeutic benefit to them.ConclusionEven though research coordinators were properly trained and the informed consent was administered according to protocol, participants demonstrated poor retention of study information. While intraoperative studies that aim to advance neuroscience knowledge represent a unique opportunity to gain fundamental scientific knowledge, improved standards for the informed consent process can help facilitate their ethical implementation. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency that Moore (...) levels at the qualitative hedonism outlined by J. S. Mill in Utilitarianism. Along the way I suggest that there are a number of ways in which Moore was unfair in rejecting qualitative hedonism as inconsistent. I close by relating the issues that arise in discussion of Moore to contemporary debates on value and reasons. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Blossoming of Bioethics at NIHEzekiel J. Emanuel (bio)The establishment of the Department of Clinical Bioethics at the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has coincided with a burgeoning of interest and activity related to bioethical issues at NIH. The department has precipitated a reexamination and revitalization of existing bioethics activities in the Clinical Center and has launched new programs especially in the (...) areas of education and research. In addition, the department contributes to the work of others throughout NIH who address bioethical issues.The Organizational Location of the Department of Clinical BioethicsBefore describing the history and current activities of the Department of Clinical Bioethics, I will say something about it administrative location. Comprehension of the department’s organizational location is essential to understanding its history, role, and function. Prior to interviewing for the position of chair of the department, I did not—and, if truth be told, still do not fully—understand the details of the organizational structure of NIH. I therefore assume that many other bioethicists outside of the Institutes, especially those who do not regularly receive NIH funding, may not fully grasp its organizational intricacies.The Department of Clinical Bioethics is a department within the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center, which is NIH’s “hospital.” Hospital is in quotes because all of the patients at the Clinical Center must be enrolled in a research protocol and, therefore, are research subjects. The Clinical Center is where NIH’s clinical researchers admit their research subjects or see them in the out-patient setting. The Department of Clinical Bioethics reports directly to the Director of the Clinical Center, John I. Gallin, M.D., and receives its finances, space, and other resources from the Clinical Center.In this way, the department is part of NIH’s intramural (“inside”) program. People employed by NIH conduct intramural research, training, and other initiatives. The extramural program, which receives approximately 87 percent of NIH’s budget, funds research at institutions outside NIH. The extramural program awards grants and contracts for research, training, and conferences conducted [End Page 455] by investigators who are not affiliated with NIH. The National Human Genome Research Institute’s ELSI (Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications) program, for example, is part of NIH’s extramural program. As part of the NIH intramural program, the Department of Clinical Bioethics is not empowered to fund independent initiatives of people outside of NIH through grants and contracts. However, the department can collaborate with bioethicists and others on research, educational, and other programs outside of NIH and has some funds to support these collaborations.In addition, it is important for bioethicists to understand that NIH is a collection of 24 institutes and centers. Although there is coordination and collaboration between the institutes and centers, each is funded separately, and each has its own scope, programs, administrative structures, research agendas, training priorities, boards of advisors, and so forth. In this sense, NIH is more like a university that has many distinct schools, each with its own dean, faculty, budget, and fund raising office, than one that is tightly integrated and centrally-administered. Within NIH’s diffuse administrative structure, the Department of Clinical Bioethics is located within one of the centers (the Clinical Center) and has defined authority and responsibility only for bioethics within that center; in addition, because the Clinical Center’s mission is to support clinical research at other institutes, the department’ mission includes supporting the work of those institutes as well. Intellectual exchanges and relationships with other institutes and centers are neither pre-ordained nor administratively established; such relationships must be developed case-by-case, topic-by-topic, and initiative-by-initiative.The History and the Development of the Department of Clinical BioethicsThe Department of Clinical Bioethics was launched in late 1996. Although the department’s creation marked a major commitment to bioethics by the Clinical Center, and especially by its director, Dr. Gallin, it was formed on a pre-existing foundation of bioethics activities at NIH. 1In 1977, John Fletcher, Ph.D., was appointed by then Director Mortimer Lipsett as the bioethicist at the Clinical Center; his official title was Assistant for Bioethics... (shrink)

In recent work, Adlam (2022b), Chen & Goldstein (2022), and Meacham (2023) have defended accounts of laws that take laws to be primitive global constraints. A major advantage of these accounts is that they’re able to accommodate the many different kinds of laws that appear in physical theories. In this paper I’ll present these three accounts, highlight their distinguishing features, and note some key differences that might lead one to favor one of these accounts over the others. I’ll conclude by (...) briefly discussing a version of a “constraint” account that I think is especially attractive. (shrink)

This essay is written on the following premises and argues for them. “Enlightenment” is a word or signifier, and not a single or unifiable phenomenon which it consistently signifies. There is no single or unifiable phenomenon describable as “the Enlightenment,” but it is the definite article rather than the noun which is to be avoided. In studying the intellectual history of the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth, we encounter a variety of statements made, and assumptions proposed, to which the (...) term “Enlightenment” may usefully be applied, but the meanings of the term shift as we apply it. The things are connected, but not continuous; they cannot be reduced to a single narrative; and we find ourselves using the word “Enlightenment” in a family of ways and talking about a family of phenomena, resembling and related to one another in a variety of ways that permit of various generalizations about them. We are not, however, committed to a single root meaning of the word “Enlightenment,” and we do not need to reduce the phenomena of which we treat to a single process or entity to be termed “the” Enlightenment. It is a reification that we wish to avoid, but the structure of our language is such that this is difficult, and we will find ourselves talking of “the French” or “the Scottish,” “the Newtonian” or the “the Arminian” Enlightenments, and hoping that by employing qualifying adjectives we may constantly remind ourselves that the keyword “Enlightenment” is ours to use and should not master us. (shrink)

Critical scholarly edition of J. G. Fichte's Closed Commercial State.

Jeffrie G. Murphy's third collection of essays further pursues the topics of punishment and retribution that were explored in his two previous collections: Retribution, Justice and Therapy and Retribution Reconsidered. Murphy now explores these topics in the light of reflections on issues that are normally associated with religion: forgiveness, mercy, and repentance. He also explores the general issue of theory and practice and discusses a variety of topics in applied ethics - e.g., freedom of artistic expression, the morality of gambling, (...) and the value of forgiveness in psychological counseling. As always, his perspective may be described as Kantian; and, indeed, this collection contains the first extended piece of Kant scholarship that he has done in years: a long essay on Kant on theory and practice. (shrink)

It is proved that the relevance logic \ has no structurally complete consistent axiomatic extension, except for classical propositional logic. In fact, no other such extension is even passively structurally complete.

Descartes nimmt in Anspruch, daß sein Argument des Deus malignus über die Einwände der Skeptiker hinausgehe. Was fügt es dem Traumargument hinzu? Die verbreitete Ansicht, der Dämon stelle die Erkenntnis mathematischer und logischer Wahrheiten in Frage, wird im folgenden diskutiert und zurückgewiesen. Die richtige Interpretation lautet: Die Annahme des Dämons unterstützt den Skeptizismus und verstärkt die Zweifel an der Existenz äußerer Objekte. Es werden drei Einwände gegen diese Interpretation erörtert und zurückgewiesen. Eine andere Auffassung vertritt Frankfurt: Die Rolle des Traumarguments (...) sei wesentlich begrenzt; die durch den Dämon aufgeworfenen Zweifel seien umfassender. Eine genaue Analyse der Entwicklung des Traumarguments in der Ersten Meditation führt zur Widerlegung dieser Interpretation. (shrink)

Most Gentzen systems arising in logic contain few axiom schemata and many rule schemata. Hilbert systems, on the other hand, usually contain few proper inference rules and possibly many axioms. Because of this, the two notions tend to serve different purposes. It is common for a logic to be specified in the first instance by means of a Gentzen calculus, whereupon a Hilbert-style presentation ‘for’ the logic may be sought—or vice versa. Where this has occurred, the word ‘for’ has taken (...) on several different meanings, partly because the Gentzen separator ⇒ can be interpreted intuitively in a number of ways. Here ⇒ will be denoted less evocatively by ⊲.In this paper we aim to discuss some of the useful ways in which Gentzen and Hilbert systems may correspond to each other. Actually, we shall be concerned with thededucibility relationsof the formal systems, as it is these that are susceptible to transformation in useful ways. To avoid potential confusion, we shall speak of Hilbert and Gentzenrelations. By aHilbert relationwe mean any substitution-invariant consequence relation onformulas—this comes to the same thing as the deducibility relation of a set of Hilbert-style axioms and rules. By aGentzen relationwe mean the fully fledged generalization of this notion in whichsequentstake the place of single formulas. In the literature, Hilbert relations are often referred to assentential logics. Gentzen relations as defined here are their exactsequentialcounterparts. (shrink)